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GRAND JURY PRACTICE IN THE 1970'S
DAviD L. FOSTER*
Of the many points with which one might deal in a discussion of anti-
trust grand juries, this article will be concerned with only the following:
Immunity, access to and use of grand jury materials, and the future of
the grand jury. A logical threshold inquiry into these areas is the ques-
tion whether the grand jury will or should continue to be utilized in anti-
trust matters.
Let us first consider the proposition that the grand jury should be
abolished in antitrust cases. Such a challenge to the grand jury concept is
not a strange proposition. In England, the grand jury was abolished,
except in a very few cases, by the Administration of Justice Act of 1933.'
Students of criminal justice-particularly those with a civil libertarian
bent-are increasingly disturbed at the existence in our society of inquisi-
torial bodies with virtually unfettered investigatorial powers which hail
citizens into secret sessions and interrogate them without counsel being
present. The following remarks by Robert Nitschke concisely state the
problem:
In addition, the witness must walk into the grand jury room alone facing,
in the secrecy of those chambers, the questions of prosecutor and grand
juror without the protection afforded by counsel or by the presence of the
court. Without the help of his lawyer the witness may be led into dis-
cussions of privileged communications or into admissions which he would
not have made if he had been refreshed on the basis of all the facts.
He cannot object to questions that are leading, double-edged or otherwise
improper in form. Only parts of documents, or only one document
of a series, may be shown to him. He cannot demand that he be allowed
to explain or to controvert facts brought out before the grand jury. He
may not be cross-examined to bring out full and complete facts.
In these circumstances, the average individual testifies under considerable
mental stress. He may forget facts that under more favorable circumstances
he would readily recall. Through suggestions of the prosecutor and grand
jurors he "recalls" matters of which he actually has no knowledge. He
gives incomplete answers. He may tend to tell the grand jurors what he
believes they wish to hear. To relieve the pressures upon himself he may
make irrelevant accusations about the conduct of third persons ....
One who questions the present utility of the grand jury is challenging
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a very old institution. Our entire jury trial system has some ancestoral
relationship with the Frankish inquistorial procedures which were brought
to England with the Norman Conquest, and in the case of the grand jury,
the relationship is particularly dose. Indeed Pollock and Maitland sug-
gest that the administrative structure utilized in preparation of the Domes-
day Book in the 11th Century is one of the ancestors of the jury system.'
Plucknett writes that "in the Assize of Clarendon (1166) we find the es-
tablishment of a definite system of inquisitions as part of the machinery
of criminal justice which have come down to our own day as 'grand
juries.' "' As the centuries rolled by the petit jury became a highly refined
tool; virtually the entirety of the law of evidence was shaped to take ad-
vantage of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the petit jury system.
The grand jury changed less. It remained and remains a blunt, crude
instrument of brute power. Its unparalleled investigatorial powers are
admittedly of vast importance to the Government in antitrust cases.
But, it has lost the counter-balancing characteristics which made those
powers tolerable--the protection of the innocent accused against un-
founded accusations. 5
There is a good argument that there is no justification for a grand jury
in any type of case, based upon the fact that such juries almost never fail to
indict. A striking illustration of that fact is the almost total absence of
reference to grand juries in the ABA Foundation's recent survey of the
decision to charge a suspect with a crime in American criminal justice.'
One would assume that if the grand jury in fact performs its function, a
major portion of the work analyzing the decision to prosecute would deal
with the grand jury.
However, there may be cases in which a grand jury has a legitimate
function to perform. The ABA study refers to motor vehicle homicide
cases as presenting such a situation, in that the grand jury, by applying
the standard of the general morals of society, is best able to decide whether
a particular fatal accident, out of the countless numbers that occur, in-
volves conduct sufficiently below societal norms to justify criminal prose-
cution.7 In any event, an antitrust prosecution is not such a case. Ex-
perienced antitrust lawyers are well aware of the difficulties which lay-
men have in understanding the basic economic laws which lead to uniform
pricing in commodity products. Juries can be expected to have difficul-
ties in drawing the almost metaphysical line which exists between unlawful
price fixing and perfectly lawful oligopolistic rationality. More impor-
tant, the grand jury cannot protect an innocent accused in an antitrust case
3 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY o ENGLISH LAw 642-44 (2d ed. 1899).
4 T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 1 at 112.
5 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).




since violations of the Sherman Act, as misdemeanors, may be prosecuted
simply on an information.8
To summarize, a grand jury has no necessary function to perform in an
antitrust case since the case can proceed without it. Moreover, it has no
logical function to perform since the layman's view of the piopriety of
conduct in question is not really of compelling concern to the Antitrust
Division. But the grand jury does have one improper function. It pro-
vides an opportunity for secrei, backroom-type interrogations without coun-
sel present which would seem to violate the policy which underlies
Miranda v. Arizona. In such iterrogations, witnesses may be placed
under oath, and then asked vague, misleading and sometimes tricky ques-
tions which they must answer, without advice of counsel, under pain
of perjury. A grand jury witness of the author's once reported that he
had been told: "The grand jury is entitled to your speculation." If the
nature of the grand jury is such that it is entitled to compel people to specu-
late, its function is not consistent with due process as generally under-
stood.
Although there are good reasons for abolition of the grand jury in
antitrust cases, such a result is unlikely to occur in the 1970's. There is,
however, one change that might reasonably be hoped for in that period.
Witnesses might be allowed to have counsel present. Certainly the new
immunity statute, discussed below, provides an urgent impetus for the
presence of counsel in the grand jury room.
Concerning immunity, everyone is aware by now that the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 repealed the earlier safe, comfortable, passive,
transactional immunity statute,'0 and substituted for it the following lim-
ited protection:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or
any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other
information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except
a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order."
The new statute differs from the old one in many respects, but the two
most obvious and important differences are in the areas of waiver and scope
of protection. Under United States v. Monia'2 it was dear that a witness
testifying pursuant to subpoena received antitrust immunity from the old
8 FED. R. CalM. P. 7(a).
0384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 443 Pa. 117, 277 A.2d 764
(1971), the court indicated that Miranda did not require that counsel be accessible to a grand
jury witness at all times, but that a witness in doubt as to his rights should be allowed to come
before the court accompanied by counsel. A petition for certiorari has been filed. Common-
wealth v. McCloskey, 40 USLW 3198 (U.S. Oct. 26, 1971).
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 32-33 (1970).
11 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
12 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
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statute without the necessity of any claim whatever on his part. He could,
of course, voluntarily waive his right to immunity, and there was a brief
period in which Antitrust Division attorneys in some areas were asking
virtually every grand jury witness if he were willing to waive. That unfor-
tunate practice appeared later to have been generally discontinued.
Under the new statute, not only must the witness take some affirma-
tive action, he must do what most business clients find instinctively distaste-
ful. He must refuse to answer a question on the grounds that it might
tend to incriminate him. In the vernacular, he must "take the fifth."
Under that statutory scheme, the witness who asserts his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination may then be presented with an order
requiring him to testify. If he is so presented and does so testify, he ob-
tains the testimonial use-restriction immunity described above. More
specifically, under § 32 of Title 15 of the old act, the witness could not
thereafter "be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may
testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise . . . ." Under the
new statute, the witness clearly can be prosecuted for transactions about
which he has testified. His only protection is against use of the compelled
testimony or information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony.
Where does the order come from which is presented to the witness
and which gives rise to the immunity? Under the present Act, it is clear
that such orders shall be issued by the federal district court in the district
in which the proceeding is or may be held, upon request of any United
States attorney. Such a request must bear the approval of the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General. A compulsion order may be requested when, in the judgment
of the United States attorney, (1) the testimony or other information
may be necessary to the public interest, and (2) the witness has refused,
or is likely to refuse, to testify or provide the information on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination. The court is charged only with
the duty of finding the existence of (1) and (2) above. Once found,
the court has no discretion. It shall issue the order. 3 The order is effec-
tive when communicated to the witness by the person presiding over the
proceeding.
It is clear, of course, that the Government can obtain the order on an
ex parte basis, even before the witness has claimed his fifth amendment
privilege. It is not clear, however, that the proceedings leading to the
order will inevitably be ex parte. Indeed, there is evidence that in some
proceedings under the Act in the Western District of Pennsylvania the
witness has appeared in open court and has there asserted his privilege
against self-incrimination. However, before considering the details of
13 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1970).
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practice under the new statute, it is important to consider whether the
statute is constitutional and how and when the constitutional question
should be raised.
The black letter test of constitutionality of an immunity statute is easy
to state: In exchange for the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination does the statute accord the witness an immunity from criminal
prosecution which is equivalent to the privilege? If the immunity is not
co-extensive with the privilege, the immunity statute is an unsatisfactory
substitute, and is unconstitutional.
The distinction between "transactional" immunity, as provided for in
repealed § 32 of Title 15, and testimonial "use-restriction" immunity
as provided for in the Organized Crime Control Act, is indeed an old
one in our law. If transactional immunity is afforded-that is, if the
witness simply cannot be prosecuted concerning anything about which he
testifies-there is no doubt about the adequacy of the substituted protec-
tion. As the Supreme Court states succinctly in Hale v. Henkel:' "But
if the criminality has already been taken away, the Amendment ceases to
apply." Whether use-restriction immunity is sufficient involves analysis
of such great cases as Counselman v. Hitchcock,'5 and Murphy v. Water-
front Commission.'6 Counselman involved a railroad commission agent
who was asked questions before a grand jury in 1890 concerning the ob-
taining of transportation rates at less than the regular tariff. He declined
to answer various questions on the ground that it might tend to incrim-
inate him and persisted in that refusal when presented with an order
which relied on a "use-restriction" type immunity statute. That statute
provided, in pertinent part:
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a
party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign
country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him
or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, in any criminal
proceeding, or the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture.' 7
The specific vice which the Supreme Court saw in the statute was related
to the "fruit-of-the-poison-tree" problem. Mr. Justice Blatchford stated for
the Court:
It [the statutej could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony
to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his
property, in a criminal proceeding in such court. It could not prevent the
obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attribut-
able directly to the testimony he might give under compulsion, and on
which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to
24 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
15 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
'6 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
17 142 U.S. at 560.
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answer, he could not possibly have been convicted.
The constitutional provision distinctly declares that a person shall not
"be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;" and
the protection of § 860 is not coextensive with the constitutional provi-
sion.18
Parenthetically, it should be noted that § 860 could readily have been
construed to prohibit use of information obtained from compelled testi-
mony. However, it is dear that the Court did not so construe it. In any
event, the importance of the Counselman opinion for present purposes is
greatly heightened by the fact that the opinion went on to establish an
even broader standard for immunity provisions.
We are dearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to
him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the
Constitution of United States. Section 860 of the Revised Statutes does
not supply a complete protection from all the perils against which the
constitutional prohibition was designed to guard, and is not a full substi-
tute for the prohibition. In view of the constitutional provision, a statu-
tory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates.' 9
Based on the latter standard, Congress enacted on February 11, 1893
an immunity provision which provided as follows:
[Nlo person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, con-
cerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or other-
wise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena, or the
subpoena of either of them, or in any such case or proceeding.20
This provision protected the witness from prosecution based on the use
of his testimony directly or indirectly but it also protected him from prose-
cution with respect to any transaction to which he may have testified
before a grand jury in obedience to a subpoena. In Brown v. Wlalker,21
the Supreme Court, citing both the narrow and broad language in Counsel-
man, held that the immunity was co-extensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination and that the statute therefore was constitutional. Al-
though the doctrine of "transaction" immunity has been sharply criti-
cized,22 in considering the constitutionality of a statute similar to the 1893
statute, the Court in Ullman v. United States23 considered the doctrine so
firmly established that it held:
181d. at 564-65.
19 Id. at 585-86.
20 Act of February 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.
21 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
22 See 8 J. WIGMOR]3, EVIENcE § 2283 at 522-24 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
23 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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Since that time the Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never been
challenged; the case and the doctrine it announced have consistently
and without question been treated as definitive by this Court .... The
1893 statute has become part of our constitutional fabric and has been in-
cluded "in substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major
regulatory enactments of the Federal Government." 24
Not until Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,25 was there any doubt
that transaction immunity was a constitutional requirement. In Murphy,
the defendants had refused to answer questions at a hearing before a
state waterfront commission. Although they had been granted immunity
from prosecution under state law, their refusal was based on the ground
that they might incriminate themselves under federal law. Reversing its
earlier position, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination protected a state witness in a proceeding under
state law from subsequent prosecution under both state and federal law,
that use-restriction type immunity would be accorded him by federal
courts, and that, although the order to testify could stand, the contempt
citation would be set aside and the witness given another opportunity to
answer the questions in light of the protection now afforded him under
federal law. In stating the rule, the Court dearly indicated that in this
instance federal transaction immunity was not required:
[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be
compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal
law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner by federal officials -in connection with a criminal prosecution
against him.26
Especially noteworthy in Murphy is the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
White, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joined, which apparently ex-
pressed the view that transactional immunity is not constitutionally re-
quired. Mr. Justice White said:
The Constitution does not require that immunity go so far as to protect
against all prosecutions to which the testimony relates, including prose-
cutions of another government, whether or not there is any causal con-
nection between the disclosure and the prosecution or evidence offered
at trial. In my view it is possible for a federal prosecution to be based
on untainted evidence after a grant of federal immunity in exchange for
testimony in a federal criminal investigation.27
The question of the impact of Murphy upon Counselman is extremely
difficult. It is clear from the legislative history of the Organized Crime
Control Act that Congress thinks that Murphy has in fact overruled Coun-
241d. at 437-38.
25378 U.S. 52 (1964).
2  Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 106.
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selman, or, more precisely, has eradicated the Counselman dictum. The
House Report states:
It is designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of Murphy
V. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) rather than the trans-
action immunity concept of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892). The witness is also protected against the use of evidence
derivatively obtained.28
It is by no m eans clear that Congress' confidence in the impact of Murphy
is justified. The courts have already split on the constitutionality of
the new statute. For example, the Seventh Circuit has held the statute
unconstitutional, 2 and the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly sustained it.0
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari from the Ninth Circuit decision
and presumably will resolve the question during the 1971 term.
Prediction of the outcome in the Court-always hazardous-requires
analysis of the opinions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Murphy which
shed some light on the impact of the decision. The cases are Albertson
v. SACB 1 which applied Counselman to invalidate an immunity statute
which, like that involved in Counselman, did not provide for exclusion of
evidence obtained by use of the compelled testimony as an investigatory
lead; Stevens v. Marks,8 2 a factually complex "waiver" case in which the
concurring opinion of Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, indicated
that the sufficiency of "use restriction" was open, but intimated that Coun-
selman "may point toward a negative answer"33 and Piccirllo v. New
York.3 4 Piccirillo is particularly interesting because the Court had granted
certiorari in order to "resolve the important question whether it is neces-
sary to accord 'transactional' immunity ...to compel a witness to give
testimony before a state grand jury . .." Because the New York Court
of Appeals had, subsequent to the decision under review, reached that con-
clusion as a matter of New York law, the Supreme Court in a per curiam
opinion dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. Justices Brennan
and Douglas wrote dissenting opinions with Justice Marshall concurring
in each, and each opinion supports the view that a requirement of trans-
actional immunity has become part of the fabric of our federal constitu-
tional law. Justice Black also dissented on the ground that the judgment
below should be vacated and the case remanded to the New York Court
of Appeals for reconsideration in light of its later opinion.
28ILR. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970).
2 9 See, e.g., In re Korman, 39 U.S.L.W. 2681 (U.S. May 20, 1971).
30See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971) cert. granted sub nom.,
Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971) In re Bowden, 44 F.2d 546 (9th Cit. 1971);
Charleston v. United States, 444 F.2d 504 (9th Cit. 1971).
31382 U.S. 70 (1965).
32383 U.S. 234 (1966).
331d. at 249-50.
34400 U.S. 548 (1971).
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At this point, one is strongly reminded of the old saying that no one
knows what the law is, but the Supreme Court has the last guess. It is
very possible that the Supreme Court's disposition of the issue will turn on
the votes of the Justices who replace Harlan and Black. The dissenting
opinions in Piccirillo suggest that Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall
will all vote against "use-restriction" immunity. Justice White's concurring
opinion in Murphy indicated strongly that he will vote for constitutional-
ity, and it is not unlikely that Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
will be on the same side of the issue. That leaves the vote three to three
for unconstitutionality without considering Justice Stewart, whose vote is
difficult to predict, since he joined with Justice White in Murphy, and with
Justice Harlan in Stevens v. Marks.
Pending a Supreme Court decision, how should a witness who wishes
to raise the constitutionality of the statute proceed? The first possibility,
of course, is to do nothing. That is, one might theoretically take the
stand and testify, and thereafter, if indicted, allege that the immunity pro-
visions of the Organized Crime Control Act are unconstitutional, and
that accordingly the repeal of the prior statute is ineffective. Such an
approach possesses the characteristics of logical rigor and practical dubiety
which are common to extreme positions.
If constitutionality is to be raised at the testimonial stage, it is apparent
that the witness must first assert his privilege. When he does so, he may
or may not be presented to a court for a hearing which leads to an order.
Very likely that order will be obtained ex parte. However, the witness
might be hailed into open court and required there to assert his constitu-
tional rights. If that is done, and if a proceeding looking toward issuance
of the order follows, prudence suggests that the constitutional issue be
raised at that time. Indeed, aside from considerations predicated upon
later review, it might be possible to persuade the district judge at that
point that the Act is unconstitutional. In any event, it seems reasonably
clear that a witness has standing to assert his constitutional question at
that stage. Pertinent cases are: In re McElrath,5 In re Bart,8 Carter
v. United States37 and In re Grand Jury Investigation.-8 Of these cases,
Carter deals specifically with a constitutional challenge to an immunity
statute, whereas the other three cases are primarily concerned with compli-
ance with statutory procedures. The cases, although not decided under
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, do raise some question as to
the propriety of the ex parte order issuance procedure-particularly where
the witness indicates a desire to be heard. In McElrath, which involved
testimony before a congressional subcommittee, the witness was allowed
3r 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
36 304 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
37417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970).
38317 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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to intervene in the proceedings leading to issuance of the order under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.
If a witness does appear, and the constitutional point is argued to
no avail, can he appeal from an order granting immunity? Probably not.
Pertinent precedents are: Cobbledick v. United States80 and In re Grand
jury Investigation.40 One could always try a peremptory writ, but the
use of the All Writs Act to escape the finality doctrine presents many
difficulties. What the witness apparently must do, therefore, in order to
get his constitutional question before the court of appeals, is to return to
the grand jury room and, when confronted with the order, refuse to
testify on the ground that it might tend to incriminate him and that the
immunity statute is unconstitutional. He will be cited for contempt, and,
of course, an appeal lies from that citation. It is important that the wit-
ness, at this stage state before the grand jury that the immunity statute is
unconstitutional, particularly if he has not had an opportunity to raise
constitutionality at a proceeding leading to issuance of the order. In
view of the familiar doctrine that constitutional questions must be season-
ably raised, and even though some relief might be given in view of the
difficult circumstances of a witness in a grand jury room without counsel
present, there would appear to be no reason to take any chance on the
matter.
There remains the practical problem of the witness who merely
wants to obtain such protection as the statute affords. Presumably every
witness who has a legitimate right to do so will assert his fifth amendment
privilege and obtain immunity. For the reasons discussed above, the
adverse effect on the grand jury of a fifth amendment claim is a minimal
consideration. Whatever public criticism may be involved if the fact of
a refusal to testify somehow becomes known outside the grand jury room
will certainly be minimized if it becomes customary for businessmen to
swallow their pride and assert their constitutional rights.
When the witness is in the grand jury room, he should refuse to answer
any incriminating question. Under Supreme Court precedent, the stan-
dard of potential incrimination is indeed broad. Under Blau v. United
States,41 the witness has a right to refuse to give any answer which could
form a "vital link" in a chain of evidence necessary to prosecute him.
According to the language of Hoffman v. United States,4 2 the witness has
a right to invoke the privilege unless it is perfectly clear that the answers
30 309 U.S. 323 (1940) (in which an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces
tecum in a grand jury investigation was not appealable because it was not a "final decision" as
required by § 128 of the Judicial Code).
40427 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding an immunity order under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970), to be non-final and unappealable
on the authority of Cobbledick, supra note 39).
41340 U.S. 159 (1950).
42341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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could not possibly tend to incriminate him. The breadth of the protection
is clearly illustrated in Simpson v. United States.43 In Simpson, the Court
reversed the decisions of three lower courts which held that the right
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply as to the
following types of questions: "Would you please state your residence?"
"Were you ever in the Armed Forces ?" "What is your present address ?"
"Did you ever attend high school?" "What is your present age?" On
their face, these questions indeed appear relatively innocuous; yet, the
Court, without opinion, summarily held that the witnesses had a right to
refuse to answer these questions on fifth amendment grounds. Other
illustrative cases are Gulf Oil Corp. v. Tug Kate Malloy,44 and In re
Levinson.45
If the witness fails to claim his privilege seasonably, he may waive the
right to refuse to answer further questions. However, the doctrine of
waiver under modern cases may not really be the trap which ultra-
cautious lawyers have believed it to be. Perhaps the high water mark of
the waiver concept is Rogers v. United States,46 which seems to stand for
the proposition that once a witness provides testimony which is self-
incriminating, in order to later invoke the privilege the witness must show
as to each subsequent question that there is a reasonable danger of further
incrimination. Moreover, if that further danger constitutes, in the words
of the Rogers court, "mere imaginary possibility," the witness will be
deemed to have waived the right to invoke the privilege. However, lower
federal court cases seem to have retreated from the broad sweep of Rogers.
In this respect it is instructive to see, for example, Hashagen v. United
States,47 and Shendal v. United States.48
Completely apart from the waiver problem, however, if the witness
is willing to claim the fifth amendment, there is simply no point in having
him fill the record with a lot of testimony before he does so. While the
point at which the privilege can properly be raised will necessarily differ
depending upon the fact situation, it is clear, for example, that in a price
fixing investigation, an executive who participated in the price determina-
tion process for his company can certainly properly refuse to answer any
question which asks him what his duties are. Indeed, he can probably
43355 U.S. 7 (1957).
44 291 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. .a. 1968).
45 219 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
40340 U.S. 367 (1951).
47 283 F.2d 345, 353 (9th Cir. 1960) ("... the doctrine of waiver should be confined in
its operation to narrow limits and charily applied else the constitutional guarantee would be-
effectively nullified by a mere expedient").
48 312 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1963) ("Once granted that the area of the question is within
the Fifth Amendment, short of being ridiculous, it would appear wiser to let the witness pick
the point beyond which he will not go").
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even refuse to state his position, although it is highly unlikely that an
answer such as "vice president" would constitute a waiver.
Since witnesses will generally be quite nervous about the whole pro-
cess, it is a good idea for their attorney to type out a brief statement for
them to read into the record by way of claiming the privilege. There is a
tendency, of course, to make such written statements as sanitary as pos-
sible. However, a statement which does not clearly indicate that the witness
fears that the answer may tend to incriminate him appears to be entirely
too sanitary. If a witness is in doubt as to whether to claim his privilege
with respect to a particular question, he should ask the examining attor-
ney for permission to leave the grand jury room to consult his counsel.
Experience indicates that that permission will almost invariably be granted.
An attorney who contemplates that his witness will assert the privilege
should consider apprising the Government in advance. It is conceivable
that the result of such advance information could be withdrawal of the
subpoena (and consequent loss by the witness of an opportunity to claim
immunity), but that risk is probably not substantively important. If the
Government's attitude toward the witness is such that it would withdraw
the subpoena upon receiving advance information of a planned immunity
claim, that same attitude would be inconsistent with the obtaining of an
immunity order if the witness asserts the privilege without advance
notice. The obvious advantage in giving advance notice is that if the
Government still wants to call the witness after receiving such notice, the
requisite approvals, and perhaps even a court order, can be obtained in
advance of the testimony. That avoids wasted time for everyone.
If the witness claims immunity without advance notification, there is
an obvious possibility that the Government attorneys will feel a degree of
irritation at the loss of grand jury time. Such irritation could result in
unpleasantness for the witness. More important, depending upon the par-
ticular practice of the district court concerned, the Government attorneys
might insist that the witness claim immunity in the presence of the court
prior to an order being signed. Such a claim is not too disadvantageous
if it can be done in chambers. However, there are obvious disadvan-
tages from an open court claim.
It is important to avoid, if possible, the filing of the immunity order
in open court files. Such filing may well be a matter which differs from
district to district. In the Northern District of Ohio, for example, grand
jury subpoenas are not public knowledge, and there is reason to believe
that immunity orders will similarly be accorded confidentiality. In some
other districts, subpoenas are not secret, and perhaps in those districts the
order will get into the public files unless steps are taken to prevent it.
A personal telephonic survey of substantially every district in the United
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States taken during the electrical equipment treble damage cases showed
that in about half of the districts grand jury subpoenas were kept secret.
Once a witness has been presented with an immunity order, it is impor-
tant to determine its scope. The author believes that in general the orders
issued under the auspices of the Antitrust Division's Great Lakes Field
Office have conformed to the language of the statute and have not at-
tempted to limit immunity to particular subject matters. If a dispute about
subject matters arises with the Antitrust Division, one possibility would
be to put the order in the language of the Attorney General's letter au-
thorizing particular Antitrust Division attorneys to conduct a grand jury
investigation. It should not be difficult to obtain access to those letters
for any reasonable purpose. In years past, the Northern District of
Ohio's letters were kept in a safe in the derk's office but were freely dis-
played to interested counsel. The advantage of using the grand jury
authorization letter is that if the Government contends that the question
was outside an order framed in those terms, it is arguably confessing to
improper use of the grand jury.
Assuming that the statute is upheld as constitutional, it is unlikely that
the Antitrust Division will indict people who have testified forthrightly.
It is clear that the desire for immunity under the old statute has broken
investigations wide open. The electrical equipment cases are an example.
It is in the Antitrust Division's best interests to encourage witnesses to
testify, and to give them some degree of confidence that they will not be
indicted if they do so. Moreover, the announced policy of the Antitrust
Division in the past has been to refrain from calling witnesses whom it
expected to indict, and that practice too may well continue. It is possible,
of course, that an overly tight witness, whom the Government suspects of
a lack of recollection bordering on perjury, might well prove to be an
exception to the foregoing practice.
Aside from immunity, grand jury practice in this decade will involve
continuing problems of access to grand jury materials. In a criminal case,
the defendant's tool for obtaining access to grand jury transcripts is Rule
6.49 Subparagraph a of that rule entitles a defendant to inspect his own
recorded testimony. In the case of a corporation, the problem is to define
the defendant. It is easiest to get the testimony of present officers, some-
what harder to get that of present non-officer employees and substan-
tially more difficult to get that of former officers and employees. A de-
cision granting broad access under Rule 16a is United States v. Air Condi-
tioning and Refrigeration Wholesalers'0 in which Judge Thomas per-
mitted inspection and copying, on motion of the defendant trade associa-
tion, of testimony of any
4 9 FED. P. Cmi. P. 16.
5o 1971 Trade Cas. 5 73,617 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
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... witness who..., either presently or formerly, was an officer, director,
employee or other person, whether paid or unpaid, and whose grand jury
testimony may tend to incriminate the corporate defendant ....
Those who live in the Sixth Circuit should also consider United States v.
Levinson,51 and, in an amusing factual setting, United States v. Cathetine
Johnson.2 In the latter case, Mrs. Johnson, perhaps a lady of the town,
testified that her services had been utilized by certain members of the
Hoffa Jury while they were confined during that celebrated trial. The de-
cision contains a discussion of particularized need in the context of an
application, which was denied, for the entire transcript of the grand jury
which indicted her.
Of course, it is important to think twice before seeking discovery of
transcripts. Unless there is reasonable certainty that trial is a viable
possibility, a Rule 16 motion, like a request for a bill of particulars, may
be more helpful to a treble damage plaintiff than it is to the defendant.
Criminal Rule 16(b) provides for discovery of other "books, papers,
documents, tangible objects or places." It may be possible to use it to get
grand jury transcripts which are not available under 16(a)."' With re-
spect to other grand jury documents, it is now a common Antitrust Divi-
sion practice to offer production insofar as not objected to by the parties
who produced the documents to the jury. This is done by means of a
court order which sets a stated time for objecting, and provides for notice
to those who furnished documents.
If discovery of grand jury transcripts under 16(a) or (b) is not effec-
tive, there are other avenues. Various decisions in the wake of Dennis
v. United States54 have afforded access to the transcripts of grand jury
testimony of Government trial witnesses during or even in advance of
their direct testimony. Such an order in the Sixth Circuit was entered in
United States v. Aeroquip Corp. 5
Treble damage plaintiffs probably will not have to seek grand jury
documents from the Government, because they can frequently obtain
copies retained by the subpoenaed corporations or their attorneys. If it is
easier for such plaintiffs, however, they may apply to the court for the
actual impounded documents, as was done in the Smog case in Los
Angeles." With respect to transcripts of witnesses, plaintiffs have been
getting them ever since the electrical equipment cases.5 7  The courts
51 405 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 958 (1969). See also Antot., 3
A.L.R. Fed. 29 (1970).
52414 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 397 U.S. 991 (1970).
53 Contra, United States v. Airconditioning and Refrigeration Wholesalers, at note 50 supra.
"4 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
5 Criminal No. 41312 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
56 United States v. Automobile Mfrs'. Ass'n., Inc., Civil 69-76 JWC (C.D. Cal.).
57 See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963).
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enunciate the usual test-a showing of "particularized need"-which in
this context seems to mean that if the witnesses admit on depositions to
murder or crimes against nature, the transcripts will not be made available.
If they deny such vices, the plaintiffs will get the transcripts.
The role of the Antitrust Division in the area of discovery of Govern-
ment transcripts is singularly uncommendable. Where a corporate de-
fendant needs the transcript to defend itself in a criminal case, the Anti-
trust Division fights hard, and talks loudly about the vital principles of
grand jury secrecy enshrined in Criminal Rule 6(e)." But where a treble
damage plaintiff wants discovery, the Antitrust Division loses all its mis-
sionary zeal, forgets about the necessity of secrecy, and washes its hands
of the matter.
The final subject for attention is use of grand jury transcripts in light
of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. A provision of those Rules,
Rule 801(d), which would have made admissible the grand jury tran-
script of any witness who testified at trial and was subject to cross-exami-
nation, fortunately has been eliminated from a later draft. 9 Traditionally,
a transcript normally has been subject to the hearsay objection but could
be used for impeachment or as past recollection recorded,60 or (perhaps
improperly) read aloud on the theory of refreshing recollection. Of course
it was also theoretically possible to use a prior consistent statement from the
transcript to support a witness whose credibility had been attacked, in that a
prior consistent statement would tend to rebut the claim of recent fabrica-
tion. Under proposed Rule 801(d) , 1 the existing law concerning prior
inconsistent and consistent statements is preserved, except that now the
statements are received as substantive evidence. Past recollection recorded
is dealt with in a fairly conventional way in proposed Rule 803 (5).2
However, this statement from the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
801 (d) should be considered: "... . [Ilf the witness admits on the stand
that he made the statement and that it was true, he adopts the statement
and there is no problem. ' ' 3 That casual comment is certainly acceptable
if read in the context of a brief statement concerning a particular fact.
However, it might be urged to justify admission of an entire grand jury
transcript on the mere basis of a present statement of the witness that:
"Of course I told the grand jury the truth, as I knew it." Such a con-
struction would go far toward restoring the prior testimony proviso which
has now been omitted from Rule 801(d).64
58 FBD. R. Ciuf. P. 6(e).
59 As printed and distributed with 322 F. Supp. Adv. Sheet No. 2 (Apr. 12, 1971).
GO See United States v. DeSisto, 329 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964).
G'See note 59 supra.
02 As printed and distributed with 322 F. Supp. Adv. Sheet No. 2 (Apr. 12, 1971).
03 Id.
04 Id.
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Finally, of course, a grand jury transcript can come in as an admission.
Under existing law, where a transcript is offered against a corporate de-
fendant on that theory, an obvious question exists as to the circumstances
under which a witness' grand jury testimony is to be regarded as testi-
mony of the corporation. Under proposed Rule 801(d) (2),65 a prior
statement offered against a party is not hearsay if, among other things, it
is his own statement "in either his individual or a representative capacity,"
or is "a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship. Under existing law, and to a somewhat lesser extent under
the new rule, before making a Rule 16(a) motion, consideration should
be given to whether the status of testimony as testimony of the corpora-
tion for purposes of discovery also renders the transcript admissible as an
admission of the corporation.
In any event, if present trends continue, greater use of grand jury
transcripts can be expected in the 1970's, which emphasizes all the more
the need for careful preparation of witnesses.
In conclusion, it is appropriate to return to the broad social policy
question raised by grand jury interrogations. Both prosecutors and treble
damage plaintiffs' attorneys (and some courts) have displayed an ap-
parently sincere feeling that witnesses are more likely to give truthful
testimony before a grand jury than in a subsequent deposition or trial
where they have the benefit of properly framed questions and the ad-
vice of counsel. It is even more surprising that many defense attorneys
seem to share the same point of view. Consider the enormity of that
proposition. If inquisitorial testimony before a grand jury is more likely
to elicit truth than open court testimony in an adversary environment,
our entire system is misconceived. Moreover trial lawyers as a group can
no longer think of themselves as participating in a lofty calling, but pre-
cisely the opposite. If by their presence in the courtroom, trial lawyers do
not serve the pursuit for truth but in fact impede it, the adversary system
should be abolished.
In actual fact, it is not the adversary trial but the inquisitorial which is
inferior. All too often witnesses who appear before grand juries are asked
confusing and misleading questions which they can not answer on the
basis of testimonial quality knowledge. Earlier, reference was made to
a statement to one of the author's witnesses: "The Grand Jury is entitled
to your speculation." Why? Unfounded speculation can lead only to
misunderstanding; it can never advance the pursuit of truth. Honest
and meaningful testimony is most likely to emerge when a proper founda-
tion is laid, when a witness is asked a comprehensible question, and when
adversary counsel are present to object to improper implications, con-
65 Id.
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clusions, and assumption of facts not in evidence. The features which
make the adversary trial a viable social institution are utterly and intoler-
ably lacking from the grand jury process.
